Because "[t]he influence of the trial judge on the jury is necessarily and properly of great weight and his lightest word or intimation is received [by the jury] with deference, and may prove controlling[,]" Quercia v. United States, 289 U.S. 466, 470 (1933) (internal quotation marks omitted), the court's exercise of discretion in managing deliberations is not without limits. For example, when responding to jury questions or requests during deliberations, every effort must be undertaken to avoid influencing or coercing a jury to reach one verdict over another. See, e.g., United States v. Nickell, 883 F.2d 824, 829 (9th Cir. 1989)["In deciding whether to allow the jury to review testimony during deliberations, the court should avoid giving undue emphasis to particular testimony." (citing United States v. Binder, 769 F.2d 595, 600 (9th Cir. 1985))]; United States v. Walker, 575 F.2d 209, 214 (9th Cir. 1978) ["Because the jury may not enlist the court as its partner in the fact-finding process, the trial judge must proceed circumspectly in responding to inquiries from the jury."]. Cf. Starr v. United States, 153 U.S. 614, 626, 14 S. Ct. 919, 38 L. Ed. 841 (1894) [advising that the trial judge must take great care to avoid commenting upon evidence in one-sided manner]. Indeed, "the principle that jurors may not be coerced into surrendering views conscientiously held is so clear as to require no elaboration." Jenkins v. United States, 380 U.S. 445, 446, 85 S. Ct. 1059, 13 L. Ed. 2d 957 (1965).
In light of the above concerns, the just must use extraordinary caution must be exercised when acting to break jury deadlock. This is particularly true with respect to the court's actions in giving an Allen charge, which already "stands at the brink of impermissible coercion." United States v. Seawell, 550 F.2d 1159, 1163 (9th Cir. 1977). Even slight deviations from the approved language and procedure can result in reversible error based upon likelihood of coercion. United States v. Mason, 658 F.2d 1263, 1267-68 (9th Cir. 1981); see also United States v. Evanston, (7/5/2011, 9th Cir. Ariz., No. 10-10159). Federal judges may not convey to a deadlocked jury the mandate that a verdict must be reached at all, as such a statement might impermissibly coerce a dissenting juror into surrendering a conscientiously held belief about the facts. See Jenkins, 380 U.S. at 446. The use of Allen charges has been so strongly "criticized as constituting an unwarranted intrusion upon the province of the jury" that several federal circuits have completely barred their use, opting instead for other forms of instruction. See Nickell, 883 F.2d at 828.
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