In general, willfulness is proved by evidence that a defendant acted voluntarily and with knowledge that his conduct was unlawful, even if he did not know the specific statute violated. See, e.g., Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 193-96, 118 S. Ct. 1939, 141 L. Ed. 2d 197 (1998) (holding in context of firearms statute that knowledge of conduct's general unlawfulness, rather than knowledge of particular statute, satisfied willfulness requirement); United States v. Bursey, 416 F.3d 301, 309 (4th Cir. 2005) (same in context of statute prohibiting willful entry or refusal to leave restricted area during presidential visit); United States v. Whab, 355 F.3d 155, 162 (2d Cir. 2004) (affirming on plain error review jury instruction that awareness of generally unlawful nature of conduct satisfied willfulness requirement in statute barring false statements to government agents). Even knowledge of general unlawfulness is unnecessary under statutes criminalizing conduct whose wrongfulness is obvious from the surrounding context. See United States v. George, 386 F.3d 383, 395 (2d Cir. 2004) [observing that because "no conceivable meritorious reason exists for knowingly submitting false information on a passport application," conviction did not require defendant's "awareness of the generally unlawful nature of his or her conduct"]. Only in rare cases where the line between innocent and culpable conduct is particularly difficult to ascertain, as in cases involving "highly technical statutes that present[] the danger of ensnaring individuals engaged in apparently innocent conduct," Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. at 194, does willfulness require a specific intent to violate a particular law.
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Forecite National™
Chapter 46: Willfulness
The Shellow Instructions
Willfulness
Forecite California™
F 1.20 - Willfully Defined