Inability Of Limiting Instruction To Cure Prejudice: Prior Convictions (6th Circuit)

United States v. Jenkins [excerpt after the jump] questioned the ability of a limiting instruction to negate the prejudicial impact of evidence that the defendant committed a prior conviction.  The danger is that the jury will treat the prior conviction as propensity evidence.

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297.3.1 - Situations Where Cautionary Or Limiting Instructions May Not Cure Prejudice
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PG X(E)(19)(1) - Inability Of Limiting Instructions To Cure Error
F 2.50 n2  Ineffectiveness Of Limiting Instruction As To Other Crimes Evidence

United States v. Jenkins, slip opn. p. 7 (6th Cir. Tenn., No. 08-5203,  2010)
And meanwhile there looms, Kong-like, the prejudicial effect of the prior conviction. "When jurors hear that a defendant has on earlier occasions committed essentially the same crime as that for which  he is on trial, the information unquestionably has a powerful and prejudicial impact." Johnson, 27 F.3d at 1193. Even when properly instructed to consider the evidence only for some legitimate purpose--as the jury was instructed here--the danger is obvious that the jury will treat it as propensity evidence instead. Under the facts presented here, we are firmly convinced that the prejudicial effect of Jenkins's prior conviction substantially outweighed its probative value. The admission of that evidence was error.