State v. Fowlkes [excerpt after the jump] provides a good example of why it is important to think beyond the standard pattern or model instructions. By delivering only the “model jury charge” on “unlawful force” the judge omitted legal principles relevant to the defendant’s theory of self defense.
State v. Fowlkes, slip opn. p. 10 (App.Div., No. A-3639-06T4, Jan. 12, 2010)
[NOTICE: This opinion is UNPUBLISHED.]
The judge delivered the model jury charge on "unlawful force," which includes an abbreviated version of the statutory definition. The jury was informed that "[u]nlawful force is defined as force used against a person without the person's consent in such a way that the action would be a civil wrong or criminal offense." Defendant contends that more was required, because, without a further explanation, the jurors could have assumed that "any" force employed by a corrections officer against a prisoner, regardless of its degree or necessity, is lawful.
We question whether these jurors -- who were instructed on aggravated and simple assault and self-defense but not on a prison guard's authority to use force against prisoners in furtherance of his duties -- would conclude that a prison guard uses lawful force, without warning, if he rushes, grabs and tries to choke a prisoner. For the purpose of emphasis, we repeat what the jury was told: "The use of force upon or toward another person is justifiable when the actor reasonably believes that such force is immediately necessary for the purpose of protecting himself against the use of unlawful force by such other person[] on the present occasion." The jurors were also instructed that assault is established by proof that the person attempts to cause or purposely, knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury, and they were informed that "an action [that] would be a . . . criminal offense" is unlawful force. The instruction did not describe any limitation on a prisoner's right to use defensive force to protect himself from an assault by a prison guard.
Despite our disagreement with the assumption that underlies defendant's claim of prejudicial error, we recognize our obligation to ensure that a jury instruction conveyed the legal principles relevant to a defense. State v. Rodriguez, 195 N.J. 165, 174-75, 949 A.2d 197 (2008). Accordingly, we consider the law governing the lawfulness of force used by prison guards in order to identify the legal principles that should have been but were not included.
