Impeachment: Limiting Instruction

Limiting instructions may be particularly appropriate when evidence has been admitted solely for impeachment purposes. (See e.g. United States v. Simels and Hill v. Stolc [excerpts after the jump].)

United States v. Simels, (E.D.N.Y., No. 08-CR-640 (JG), Dec. 4, 2009)   
A defendant is entitled to a jury instruction that impeachment material may "not be considered as substantive evidence going to the guilt or innocence of the defendant." See United States v. Baftiri, 263 F.3d 856, 858 (8th Cir. 2001).

Hill v. Stolc, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113420 (E.D. N.Y., No. C08-1832 RSM, Dec. 4, 2009)
The trial judge's instruction to the jury during deliberations that "[y]ou may consider what you heard on that tape only on the issue of assessing the credibility of Ms. Robinson's testimony" sufficiently cured any harm caused by the prosecutor's misuse of the evidence. See Burks v. Borg, 27 F.3d 1424, 1431 (9th Cir. 1994) (prosecutor's improper closing argument did not have "a substantial and injurious effect or influence" on the jury's verdict where the trial judge took "prompt and effective action" to correct the impropriety). The Court must presume that the jury followed its instructions. Drayden, 232 F.3d at 713 (citing Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 324 n.9 (1985)).